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Ordinary Language Film Studies
INTRODUCTION
If we are hoping to study film philosophically but not theoretically then I
advise that we look to a practice within philosophy that is not theoretical.1
That practice is called Ordinary Language Philosophy, widely referred to as
OLP (an acronym I will use in this essay). It developed as a philosophical
practice from the 1940s to the late 1970s, most prominently in the United
Kingdom, and most particularly at the University of Oxford. Many of the
underpinnings of OLP can be found in the later writings of Ludwig Wittgen-
stein, most significantly in the Philosophical Investigations. The celebrated
practitioners of OLP were J.L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle, and their teaching
and writing represents the purest form of the pursuit. Peter Strawson is also
an important figure although he offers a less pure form. Stanley Cavell, who
studied under Austin, is associated with OLP, and his early work in particular
engages directly with it (for example, the essays ‘Must We Mean What We
Say?’ and ‘Austin at Criticism’).2 Cavell’s work has been important in influ-
encing a small, but growing, band of contemporary philosophers who value
OLP.
In this essay I want to propose the usefulness of an OLP approach to film
studies. Some limitations of theoretical methods will be voiced, but my main
purpose is not to present a critique of theory, nor imply its worthlessness. It
is to offer a productive alternative. I think this approach has been important
to my academic practice in teaching and writing over the years, although I
had not realised how close my practice was to OLP, and I had not, therefore,
explicitly explored the link with this philosophical tradition. OLP works par-
ticularly well in an applied form because it is inherently methodological and
purposefully transferable. I can testify to it offering both practical benefits
for film analysis and a secure explanation for adopting it as an approach (and
the relinquishing of other approaches). Nevertheless, it has not, I hope, been
the only part of my practice, and I do not think it should operate in a vac-
uum. It aids, rather than usurps, other methods and skills associated with
observation, anatomisation, interpretation, and evaluation that are equally
important for film study.
I. WHAT IS ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY?
OLP is a form of linguistic philosophy and was part of what was known as
the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy. Sally Parker-Ryan explains:
Linguistic philosophy may be characterised as the view that a
focus on language is key to both the content and method proper
to the discipline of philosophy as a whole.3
This might appear an odd basis from which to propose a philosophy suitable
for the study of film. After all, film is made up of images and sounds. Lan-
guage, often manifesting in the form of dialogue or voiceover, is only one small
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part of the art. There are two responses to this apparent oddity. Firstly, the
‘language’ to which I will be referring is the language we use in film study.
OLP believes that the world, life, and reality are well understood and revealed
by the examination of our language use. Equally I am proposing that films
can be well understood and revealed by the examination of our language use
(about them). Secondly, I will be proposing an analogy with the ‘language’
of film, and by ‘language’ I mean the entire audio-visual form by which a
film expresses itself. I do not think that all our relationships to films will
be enhanced by using an OLP approach – indeed many forms of everyday
enjoyment of films can exist untouched by it – but I do think that the study
of film can be enhanced. Hence the label: ‘ordinary language film studies.’
Although classic OLP was short-lived and was only practised by a rela-
tively small group of philosophers, it was for a while the preeminent mode
of doing professional philosophy in Britain. It now appears to be a minor,
idiosyncratic tributary of analytic philosophy, as distinct from continental
philosophy in so far as the distinction can be maintained, but it offers some-
thing different to the standard characteristics and practices of both. OLP
was a stage in the linguistic turn that analytic philosophy had already made,
and yet it rejects that core ‘analytic’ feature namely ‘decompositional anal-
ysis’: ‘the decomposition of facts into their ultimate simple constituents and
the revelation of their logical forms.’4 (It is, nevertheless, ‘analytic’ in a more
ordinary sense because it closely analyses the placement and use of words in
specific expressive contexts.) OLP was criticised from within analytic phi-
losophy and much contemporary analytic philosophy, aside from passages of
necessary terminological or conceptual clarification, does not resemble OLP,
or fundamentally incorporate its method. It is worth noting that the title
‘Ordinary Language Philosophy’ was originally a derogatory designation em-
ployed by those who opposed it, although like some other terms of abuse it
has been, on the whole, quite happily co-opted and redeemed by proponents
of OLP. Although meant condescendingly and dismissively, OLP is an ac-
curate and pithy description outside the abusive perspective. But the term
‘ordinary’ can also be misleading. Therefore, it is worth clarifying what is at
stake in the term, what one means by it, and the context from which it arose.
Ordinary Language Philosophy developed in response to what has been
called ‘Ideal Language Philosophy’. ILP proceeds on the basis that philoso-
phy requires the development and utilisation of an ‘ideal’ language. It sees
‘ “ordinary” language as obstructing a clear view on reality – it is thought
to be opaque, vague and misleading, and thus stands in need of reform (at
least insofar as it is to develop philosophical truth).’5 Within analytic phi-
losophy, the aim of an ILP was to uncover a supposed ‘depth grammar’, a
prevailing structure and logic, pure and unsullied, that was presumed to un-
derpin language and therefore representation. (Wittgenstein’s early work was
arguably engaged in this uncovering.) The mistrust of ordinary language, the
sense that it obstructs a truthful understanding of the world, and obscures
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philosophical clarity, encouraged the desire for philosophy to adopt, and work
in, a meta-language, or artificial language. Rudolph Carnap wrote, ‘Since in
our view the issue in philosophical problems concerned the language not the
world, these problems should be formulated, not in the object language, but
in the meta-language.’6
OLP is sceptical of this: it is the construction of an ideal language or
meta-language that is ‘opaque, vague, and misleading’. However, ‘ordinary
language’ should not simply be equated to the language of the ‘common’ man
or woman, or that used by so called ‘ordinary’ people. For OLP, ‘ordinary’
refers to an established type of occurrence, and in many cases that will mean
an everyday or commonplace occurrence, but the emphasis is on occurrence.
How might language ordinarily be used, and make sense, in various contexts
including specialist ones, for example in science and sub-cultures. Indeed,
although OLP is impatient with the importation of specialist terminology
into contexts where non-specialist language would be more functional, it is
not against such terminology per se because this could equally lead to precise
specification.
Use within context is prioritised by OLP and it shares the idea of language
that Wittgenstein sets out in the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein
rejects the notion that words have a fixed meaning, and instead emphasises
the variation in meaning that depends on, for example, situation, placement,
address, and tone. We should not assume, according to Wittgenstein, that
because a word means something then there must be one thing that it means,
something definitive. The ‘family resemblance’ idea helps explain this point.
There are many ‘proceedings’ we call games – ‘board-games, card-games, ball-
games, Olympic games’ but there is not necessarily something ‘common’ to
them all, and we may seek in vain for some single commonality.7 Even if
we found a commonality it would not necessarily be the most productive end
point because we will have arrived at a banal generality. Instead Wittgenstein
writes that ‘we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-
crossing’ which he characterises as ‘family resemblances’.8 The word ‘game’
does not have a single meaning, each game is not something of the same kind,
and each use of the word ‘game’ will have contextual dependencies. Ryle
thinks that many of our expressions are of this nature: they have what he
calls an ‘elasticity of signification’.9 Many words do not stand for something
or refer to something in an obvious, direct way. They do not straightforwardly
designate.
This understanding of language underpins the various aspects of OLP.
OLP engages in delineating the variety of meanings that a single word, and
its derivatives, can have depending on context, and concomitantly is attentive
to the confusions arising from this ‘elasticity’. Ryle wrote about expressions
that become part and parcel of our assumptions but which can be ‘system-
atically misleading’.10 One of the central problems in traditional philosophy,
for OLP, was the reliance on customary senses of words while simultaneously
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using them in non-customary ways (for example, ‘looks’, ‘seems’, ‘appears’ or
‘perceives’ in sense-data theory). Non-specialist language being put to work
it was not capable of doing, or losing its sense in inhospitable contexts, was
more of a problem for OLP philosophers than the adoption of specialist lan-
guage. According to OLP, traditional philosophy wants, and needs, to take
advantage of ordinary phrases like ‘to know’ to investigate what we ordinarily
understand by knowing and knowledge, but then does not use them in ways
we ordinarily would. There is therefore an inconsistency in the procedure.
At the same time as monitoring the circulation of one word, OLP was
attracted to the precision of specification offered by the variety of words that
any context might deserve. OLP commends ‘our common stock of words’
which as Austin famously proclaimed ‘embodies all the distinctions [people]
have found worth drawing, and the connections they have found worth mak-
ing, in the lifetimes of many generations’ and which ‘have stood up to the
long test of the survival of the fittest’.11 For Austin, ‘our common stock of
words’ gifts us with the opportunity for subtle and finessed reference and
distinctions.12 This valuing of the ‘common stock’ does not mean, however,
as some have taken it to mean, that OLP’s recourse to ‘ordinary’ language is
in some way a covert or even overt way of confirming the status quo through
the reinforcement of mainstream linguistic practices. On the contrary, OLP
invites us to be vigilant about language: to show sensitivity to contextual
suitability and to scrutinise taken-for-granted assumptions about meanings
and usage encrusted through habit.
II. TESTING OF LANGUAGE
Most, if not all, of us in film studies are using language to analyse films and
therefore the testing of our language will have direct disciplinary benefits.
The method proceeds by asking ourselves why we are using a certain word or
phrase. Why have we chosen it? What do we mean to say? What work do
we think it is doing for us? Might it be substituted or added to? Might it be
inconsistent or incompatible with other words we are using? As is commonly
the case with OLP a pedagogical dimension is never far away, and accounting
for the method from a pedagogical point of view is instructive. Within film
studies I have long advocated and practised a form of seminar which consis-
tently keeps film sequences in view, preferably on some sort of large screen,
where they are played, paused, and rewound. Teacher and student move
through the sequences together, over the time of the seminar, cooperatively
developing and refining the articulation of descriptions, interpretations, and
evaluations. Together they remain orientated either to test pre-existing claims
or more importantly to generate grounded insight. This procedure is coupled
with the more familiar one of teaching through questioning – the Socratic
method – but it is not simply equivalent to it because the Socratic method
need not necessarily examine language use. Nor should it be equated to what
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we might call a literary or fine-writing purpose: speaking and writing more
beautifully, evocatively, or resonantly (which may or may not be desirable
depending on the context). Firstly, through the testing of language use, the
student (and the teacher) are encouraged – platitudinous as this may sound
– to think, speak, and write clearly, and to make sense. Geoffrey Warnock
reports that for Austin and Ryle
above all things obscurity was to be avoided . . . the philosopher’s
first duty, prior even to that of being right . . . was to be clearly,
plainly, and readily understood.13
P.M.S. Hacker, following the OLP tradition, understands philosophy to be
the ‘tribunal of sense’, and although some philosophical practice refutes this,
I think this could be regarded as one respectable aim of philosophically ori-
entated film study.14 Avner Baz helpfully frames the matter of sense less
dutifully or judicially, and more sympathetically, as something continuous
with the ‘everyday’ flow of interpersonal communication: ‘OLP is a natu-
ral extension of perfectly ordinary and everyday attempts to become clearer
about what we or others are saying or thinking.’15 Clearly and plainly com-
municating something is of limited value, however, if the insight is limited.
Therefore, a student is equally encouraged to be alive to words, expressions,
phrases, and concepts that will enable illuminating distinctions, discrimi-
nations, characterisations, connections, and categorisations concerning their
object of study.
Understood through the lens of OLP, this would be considered a par-
ticularly philosophical way of teaching, although it would not appear to be
teaching philosophy or philosophical subjects or being philosophical about
film. From a pedagogical point of view, I suppose it might be called a skill-
based form of learning, and indeed Austin, following Wittgenstein, wrote
about words being ‘our tools’.16 He then went on to write, ‘as a minimum,
we should use clean tools: we should know what we mean and what we do
not, and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us.’17
However, proceeding in this way can appear as if substantive matters are be-
ing ignored, and the risk is student bewilderment and irritation as we fiddle
while Rome burns.
Ignoring substantive matters was a criticism of OLP philosophy itself (and
of Wittgenstein’s philosophy). The objection is true in so far as OLP does
not feel obliged to directly philosophise about, for example, reality or being
or mind or existence or the existence of deities as much philosophy has and
does. Nevertheless, it is interested in examining how we speak about these
things; indirectly therefore it does aim to be insightful and illuminating about
them, about the world, about reality. Parker-Ryan explains that
for the Ordinary Language philosophers, [although] the aim was
to resolve philosophical confusion . . . one could expect to achieve
392
Andrew Klevan
a kind of philosophical enlightenment, or certainly a greater un-
derstanding of ourselves and the world, in the process of such
resolution.18
For Strawson, ‘this did count as new knowledge – for it made possible [a]
new understanding of our experience of reality.’19 In terms of film study,
I would argue, following Strawson, that adopting an ordinary language ap-
proach makes possible a ‘new understanding’ of our experience of films or
film. There can still be a desire, perhaps heartfelt, to be revealing about
phenomena, but via a linguistic route.
The sense of ‘enlightenment’ through the analysis of language opposes the
image of OLP as conservative. This image is based on the argument that be-
cause of its reliance on ordinary language, OLP ends up being ‘a defense of
ordinary beliefs’.20 I would argue the contrary: OLP tends to shine a light
on the problems in our beliefs, and our articulation of them, problems which
accrue as misappropriations and vagueness are layered and conserved. A re-
lated charge is that OLP is quietist. David Macarthur has recently proposed
that OLP is indeed quietist in the sense that it is ‘non-doctrinal’ and suspi-
cious of ‘the disengagement of some thinking from a proper sensitivity to the
empirical’.21 OLP’s quietist mentality should not be seen therefore as an ‘end-
of-philosophy philosophy’ or as ‘defeatist’ because it can help unbind us from
‘fixed convictions . . . [in] ethical, social, and political reflection’.22 To this I
would add aesthetic reflection. Ridding oneself of philosophical doctrine, of
‘illusions and fixations’, is understood as enlightening and therapeutic.23
III. AN ALTERNATIVE WAY OF PHILOSOPHISING
One mainstream strand of Film-Philosophy treats films as being philosophi-
cally meaningful, not merely as cinematic presentations of some pre-existing
philosophy but as philosophically expressive in a distinct and equally cre-
ative way. According to this point of view, Philosophy, with a capital P,
is not brought to film, rather films can be fundamentally philosophical or
discover for themselves what Philosophy has discovered or is discovering (a
Cavellian formulation). In this way films are said to ‘do’ philosophy. I have
no problem with the idea that films can be philosophical or ‘do’ philosophy
because my experience has shown me that films can be and do any number of
things. They can be philosophical, and they can also be emotional, political,
comical, beautiful, fanciful, fantastical, skilful, and so on (or if you like they
can do emotion, do politics, do comedy and so on). Many of my own interests
in film study relate to achievements of film form which need not, and often
are not, philosophical. Excellent timing, for example, of a gag, or of a shot
transition, or of a physical gesture, or of a dance step, is not philosophical
(or need not be for it to be excellent). One advantage of an OLP approach
is that it is non-denominational. Because its approach is methodological and
pedagogical, it does not require a film to be philosophical (formally or the-
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matically). An OLP approach would not feel the need to address the form
and content of films in philosophical terms.
Another prominent mode of Film-Philosophy, and Film Theory before it,
is directly philosophising or theorising about, for example, film as a medium,
film ontology, film images, film narratives or film meaning. This philosophy
aims to provide a revelatory interpretive picture, schema, or paradigm by
which to perceive, understand, or experience, or explain how we perceive, un-
derstand, or experience. It provides ways of labelling and classifying; permits
a detached overview; and identifies overarching forces, underlying structures,
or prevailing systems. From a theoretical point of view, a dedicated attention
to individual films may make one oblivious to these things. Furthermore, al-
though any person may theorise independently, quite often they do so by way
of individual philosophers and theorists, who may or may not have examined
film themselves, for example, Judith Butler, Cavell, Gilles Deleuze, Sigmund
Freud, Emmanuel Levinas, Karl Marx, Christian Metz, Laura Mulvey (via
Jacques Lacan), or by way of working within a particular field of theory, for
example, Apparatus Theory, Cognitive Theory, Ontological Theory, or Affect
Theory. In addition to theorising of a more metaphysical bent, and arguably
more commonly practised now, philosophies and theories are also applied to
individual films (for example, a Heideggerian interpretation of The Thin Red
Line [Terrence Malick US 1998]).
An OLP approach does not intend to offer an explanatory or interpretive
paradigm or picture in the way these approaches intend to do, and powerfully
have done. This alternative approach would offer opportunities. One would
be to operate on a smaller scale, and to be free from the pressure for claims
to be all embracing. OLP prefers a form of manageable investigation of phe-
nomena and associated concepts through localised observation. In film study
this means building one’s thoughts out of the close analysis of, and articu-
lations about, passages of individual films. There is also the opportunity to
be responsive to matters arising without needing to establish a position and
perspective too prematurely, and then requiring the film to conform. The
flip side of a theoretical paradigm being widely explanatory is that it can
be, as Warnock says, ‘potentially distorting, inhibiting clear . . . perception
of the actual phenomena under consideration’.24 The theoretical ‘picture’, in
Wittgenstein’s sense, takes too strong a hold, leading to precipitous general-
isation and formalisation. To be fair, however, it is not only theory that may
encourage these tendencies. A theme, an argument, or any extrinsic concern
having too great a grip on our thinking may overdetermine our perception
and cognition.
And overdetermine our vocabulary too. I explained earlier the desire
within philosophy for an ideal language to replace the inadequacies of ordinary
language. This desire for an improved or different language by philosophy re-
sembles the desire by many working in the humanities, especially from the
394
Andrew Klevan
late 1960s/early 1970s and onwards. From their point of view, film criticism
that used ordinary language was obstructing a clear view of individual films
and of film as a medium. As a result, they introduced their own favoured ter-
minology and locutions, often by way of theoretical paradigms, which would
better, more rigorously, and more systematically, account for the nature and
expression of art, including film. As the paradigms are utilised, a set of words
is deployed, and quite often a narrow set because the intention is for different
phenomena to be brought into the same descriptive fold to signal similarity.
The desire for an encompassing vocabulary can be contrasted to the desire for
an individuated vocabulary to signal difference. The OLP approach affords
the opportunity to adopt a wider range of words varying according to film and
viewer. One problem with the locutions of theory is that they can become
tired from over-extended employment and may then restrict thought (even if
they once enabled it). By introducing words which offer variation and grada-
tion into a stale discourse ‘new decisions, beliefs, acts, and critical appraisals
[are made] possible’.25 Jonathan Rée explains that for OLP ‘the idea was to
reveal the intellectual riches that were sedimented in natural languages’.26
Another branch of the philosophical study of film, one that associates
itself with contemporary analytic philosophy of art, also arguably adopts a
theoretical methodology. It is not, however, often recognised as doing so,
especially by its practitioners. This might be because they have been keen
to differentiate themselves from some of the theoretical tendencies I have
outlined (for example, the application of the work of individual theories or
theorists to films). In his recent trenchant study of OLP, Baz puts forward
the argument that contemporary analytical philosophy can be understood
as broadly theoretical.27 A theory about a subject such as knowledge, jus-
tification, causation, necessary truth, or belief is proposed – for aesthetics
these subjects might be medium specificity, realism, spectatorship, moralism,
intentionalism, or fictionality – and then various ‘cases’, or examples, are
offered to support or not support the theory, or to test the theory. These
‘cases’ give the appearance of a certain empirical authority, but for Baz the
method is a reduced, detached, and disorientated abstraction; not orientated
to, and not naturally emerging from, a reality which the analytic philosopher
is often trying to explain. An ordinary language approach would build from
the ground (of the film/s) upwards. Instead of looking around for examples
or ‘cases’ to test or answer a theoretical question, it would let its questions
and analysis arise from out of the actuality of the films and the experience of
them.
This does not mean that an ordinary language film study would reject all
generality. This is because, firstly, insight based on a theory can serve an in-
terpretation of a film where it seems appropriate to do so. Theories contribute
to our picturing of the world, and they become part of the generative cultural
life and a way of understanding aspects of it. If I think that a scene in a film
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that uses a mirror is illuminated by citing the Lacanian mirror phase, then
all to the good. However, this need not mean that the scene is necessarily
determined in some sense by that Lacanian theory; nor need it mean that
my reading is determined by the theory (or in opposition to it); nor need
it mean that every mirror scene, or even all of this particular scene, would
be illuminated by the theory; nor need it mean that there was something
‘essentially’, or even commonly, Lacanian about the film apparatus and its
expression; and nor need it mean that the surrounding analysis will require a
Lacanian vocabulary (as distinct from using the Lacanian vocabulary when I
thought it was a revealing way of describing an aspect).28
Secondly, generality is required because the assessment of any object
partly operates by recognising and understanding its place in a variety of
categories or families. The OLP method is ‘comparative-descriptive’ and any
descriptive approach is refined by comparison.29 The families need not be
tight, well established, or even consciously recognised and explicated in the
culture. Films from different places and periods may be involved in a produc-
tive comparison depending on the investigation. Ordinary language film study
recognises ‘the worth or significance of a family of contingent instances’.30
Thirdly, ordinary language film study embraces generality by giving us a
synoptic ‘overview of a concept’ or ‘a surveyable representation of the relevant
field of concepts’.31 It studies and clarifies concepts, and how we do, and how
we might, usefully employ them. Ryle has an essay trying to get to grips with
the term ‘feeling’: so as to better understand and clarify our aesthetic claims,
it examines a range of ways in which we use the word ‘feeling’ in different
contexts.32 In film study, there may be something in a film we are trying to
explain or understand or evaluate. For example, we may think that a film
has a part which is anomalous, and which apparently contradicts its formal
scheme. We want to work out if this is indeed the case or whether the part fits
in a way we have not yet perceived. In a forthcoming publication, Dominic
Lash shows the profit in distinguishing between ‘coherence’, a commonly used
aesthetic concept from ‘cohesion’ and ‘consistency’ (which are less frequently
used aesthetic concepts).33 Lash develops these variations in response to the
formal choices of a variety of films. These are the sort of linguistic distinctions
that help me think through the matter under examination. They unblock my
thought and then provide a way through. Wittgenstein compared this ‘to
drawing a map – a map that will help us find our way around in the field of
our concepts and conceptual structures’.34 This has therefore been referred
to as ‘conceptual cartography’: Ryle talks about the ‘logical geography’ of
concepts; Strawson calls it ‘connective analysis’.35 This method contrasts
to the decompositional and reductive analysis of analytic philosophy in its
early and later phases. It is neither ‘decomposing’ nor ‘constructing’, neither
breaking something down nor building something up (for example a theory).36
It aims to become aware of, and benefit from, the network of our conceptual
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scheme, the connections between adjacent words and concepts. Ordinary
language film study is underpinned by an engagement with concepts – albeit
worked through in material, concrete, contextual ways – and provides another
reason why it can be understood as philosophical.
To get to grips with general matters or ‘problems’ that occupy us or puzzle
us either about a film or film as a medium there is an alternative route to the
one that has been commonly pursued. We do not need to approach the ques-
tions that occupy us in an abstract or general manner, even if the questions
are relatively metaphysical in orientation: ones, for example, about ontology,
being on film, presence, existence, space, time, or cause and effect. We can
also pursue ‘big’ questions from the ground up through perceptive articula-
tions of local specificity hand in hand with connective analysis. Although the
insights of theory like any piece of knowledge may aid our investigation, we
do not need to apply, or work within, or through, the paradigms, schemes, and
themes of theorists, or theoretically minded philosophers, in order to pursue
these questions about films. Oswald Hanfling writes,
Wittgenstein . . . directs our attention to “the particular case”
. . . the remedy must be sought within the situation . . . as when
we ask a person to explain what [they] mean . . . There is no
general problem, requiring a general (theoretical) solution, about
determinacy of sense.37
Rather than, for example, applying a theory of beauty, or constructing one,
we would attend to beauty when we felt the ascription might be called for
and examine its suitability, particularity, and the associated ascriptions which
ensue. We are then involved in a mutually informing scrutiny of object and
concept.
IV. FILM EXPRESSION
OLP regards language as an expressive human action rooted in situated con-
texts of delivery and reception. As Baz clarifies, OLP is not interested in just
any context, but the ‘specific context of significant use’.38 Austin thought that
traditional philosophy was obsessed with objective and abstracted proposi-
tional statements that are, for example, judged on a true/false basis. This
distorted philosophical analyses because it overlooked the variety of ways lan-
guage can be, and is, commonly used, notably for what he called illocutionary
and ‘performative’ purposes: for example, promising, warning, implying, teas-
ing, or seducing. Alice Crary and Joel de Lara use the example of ‘to know’:
we do not simply use ‘to know’ to express epistemological certitude or lack
of it (“I know this keyboard sits on my desk in front of me”), but also, for
example, to ‘reassure’, to ‘acknowledge’, to ‘protest’ and to ‘jest’.39
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[S]ensitivity to what . . . a speaker is doing with her words . . . is
internal to our ability to grasp what she is saying with those words
on a particular occasion.40
And ‘what she is saying’ is nothing less than what she means to say.
In line with this, Toril Moi thinks that artworks should be treated as
‘expressive actions’ rather than simply objects or representations (and repre-
sentations of meaning) that are perceived.41 For Moi they are ‘utterances’,
and we might consider artworks, including films, as illocutionary utterances
endeavouring to make us laugh, or cry, or think, or understand, or sense, or
appreciate, or more fundamentally to make us see and hear (certain things
rather than others). In this way, films can be responded to and evaluated as
expressive actions corresponding in some respect to how we respond to and
evaluate other expressive actions made by human beings. This encourages us
to embrace the context of the engagement between film and any individual
viewer: what a film means, to put it in the terms of Austin’s critique, is not
a neutral fact, something that is simply true or false, but rather response
and respondent dependent. It will require, evoking Crary and de Lara, a
‘sensitivity to what . . . [a film] is doing . . . our ability to grasp what [it] is
saying with those [images and sounds] on a particular occasion.’ I think the
acknowledgement of film as action also encourages us to engage with the form
in which a film is expressed and with its address: how it is expressed, the way
it is, its attitude, its tone, and its qualities.
OLP is attuned to how words variously combine with each other, and
how this adjusts meaning and effect. This combination was what Wittgen-
stein understood to be the sentence’s grammar, and the resulting analysis of
its form would be a ‘grammatical investigation’. According Arata Hamawaki,
this attention to a word’s positioning and the way it interlocks (‘the horizontal
dimension of meaning’) replaces a more traditional emphasis in philosophy on
what a word refers to (‘the vertical dimension of meaning’).42 OLP’s alertness
to the context-variant quality of spoken and written language can be trans-
ferred to the analysis of film language. Therefore, with a film we would try to
assess, for example, this facial expression, by this female performer, after she
has been addressed in this way, in this scene, in this film, in this narrative, in
this form, and in this style. The comprehension, the interpretation, and the
evaluation will take place in a specific combinational or relational context. A
similar expression in a different scene and in a different film would need to be
assessed differently, just like the same or similar word, expression, or concept
in the language. Any aspect of a film’s form – the closeness of the camera,
the gesture of a performer, the music on the soundtrack, the tonal address,
the pacing of an action – will adjust its meaning and value depending on its
use (in the sequence and the film). The interpretation and evaluation of a
similar feature would be different in another film. Attention to relations, in-
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deed to the form in which any work is configured, is the bedrock of aesthetics,
and aesthetic criticism. The aesthetic study of a film’s form can therefore be
understood as a grammatical investigation.
For OLP the import of phrases can be obscured by, as Hacker writes,
‘misleadingly similar grammatical forms of expression’ and as an example he
contrasts “I have a pain” with “I have a pin”, two phrases with a similar
surface grammar, separated in fact by only one letter, but which express
quite different things.43 Hacker argues that if you understand language to
have depth structure you may be inclined to make the type of mistake that in
this case would ‘project the grammar of ownership (“I have a pin”) on to the
‘grammar of sensation’.44 One influential strand in film studies has believed
that there is a ‘depth structure’ to the language of film, one that carried over
from film to film. Examples of ‘structuralist theory’ in film studies might
be Metz’s “Grande Syntagmatique”, psychoanalytic film theory, and Marxist
film theory. These theories proposed that although individual films might
appear to differ on the ‘surface’, there was a consistent logic to the way they
worked, a permanent and fundamental ‘depth grammar’. We can also see a
version of this structuralism in the influential work by David Bordwell and
colleagues such as that found in Narration in the Fiction Film or The Classical
Hollywood Cinema (although this takes a more logically positivist or empirical
form than first- generation structuralism).45 Here the ‘Classical Hollywood
Cinema’, for example, has a depth grammar which determines the narrative
and stylistic strategies of individual films. Apparently anomalous features
are skin deep or can be accommodated. The focus of these approaches is on
the identification and examination of similarities of structure, on the repeat,
and the ‘depth grammar’ was fundamentally important to the nature of any
individual film. Surface variations might be recognised, but the identification
of these structures was rarely a starting point to highlight, focus upon, and
ultimately value difference.
In contrast, for OLP, difference is recognised where there does not appear
to be any, for example, in the exposure of a word’s diverse qualities, subtly
adjusting its meaning across its varying applications (for example in Ryle’s
variegating of ‘feeling’). Ordinary language film study would still recognise
prevailing forms: styles, conventions, and behaviours across genres, œuvres,
and periods. This recognition would be, however, to understand the differ-
ent and distinctive uses to which they may or may not be put. Moreover,
structure and logic within a film are also recognised. The OLP approach is
not radically discrete, expedient, or momentary. Sandra Laugier claims that
OLP does not discard logic when it rejects an ILP but redefines logic within
ordinary language.46 Adrian Martin has referred to the ‘poetic logic’ of a
film, and an OLP approach is attentive to whether, and in what way, and to
what end, features across a film fit, cohere, pattern, and rhyme.47
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V. REVELATORY ARTICULATION
OLP believes there are opportunities for philosophical insight by utilising our
expansive vocabulary and richly varied modes of expression. An essential
practice for Austin and Ryle was deliberating over terminological differences,
repeatedly drawing attention to closely related words which allow for a more
accurate characterisation. For example: the differences between ‘doing some-
thing deliberately, intentionally and on purpose’ or perhaps ‘doing something
recklessly, heedlessly, and thoughtlessly’ or perhaps ‘doing something absent-
mindedly, inadvertently, and unwittingly’.48 For Austin these made all the
difference in understanding and evaluating human action and responsibility.
Connolly asks us to
consider the distinctions among leaving, departing from, forsak-
ing, abandoning, fleeing, and retreating from another. All of these
actions can involve moving away from another; but the differences
among them are differences in the intentions, beliefs, and respon-
sibilities one agent can be said to have with regard to the other.49
Laugier explains how Austin thought these distinctions were superior to the
philosopher’s traditional distinctions, because they are less artificial, more
natural.50 Much traditional analytic philosophy used language in a ‘rigid,
one-dimensional, rather blunt’ manner, such that it lost its ‘descriptive power’
and therefore had less capability to make sense of the matter in hand.51 For
OLP, our linguistic distinctions reflect, and have evolved along with, shared
judgements about the world; capturing and constituting the ongoing discrim-
inations and discernments that we wish to make and articulate. Laugier,
therefore, understands Austin’s pursuit of linguistic distinctions as his ‘real-
ism’ and his own ‘form of empiricism’.52 Austin writes in ‘A Plea for Excuses’,
the essay where he most straightforwardly states his position, ‘we are looking
. . . not merely at words . . . but also at the realities we use the words to talk
about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our percep-
tion of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena.’53 Indeed, Austin
called this method, with a little embarrassment, ‘linguistic phenomenology’.54
This ‘linguistic phenomenology’ can be, and has been, practised in rela-
tionship to films (allowing us to better perceive them). The OLP method has
remarkable affinities to the practice we commonly call ‘close reading’, and in-
deed Austin talked about ‘hounding down the minutiae’.55 There is no doubt,
as any practitioner will testify, that it is a difficult activity. It is difficult partly
because of that ‘bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language’
about which Wittgenstein wrote.56 V.F. Perkins announces that one of the
biggest challenges for the study of film is the ‘problem with oneself, of finding
the words that fit one’s sense of the moment or the movie’.57 I have noted
before in my academic work that I understand a principal discipline of film
study to be the training of oneself, perpetually, to translate a medium which
is visual and aural, and moving, into words and sentences whether that be for
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conversations, inside or outside of a seminar, or for essays, books, or blogs.
Therefore, film study is not only about providing knowledge and understand-
ing about another artform, but the process of translation into different forms.
Although the purposes of the translation could vary, the primary purpose for
me would be to better understand and articulate my aesthetic experience,
that is trying to find the words that best help me make sense of, characterise,
interpret and evaluate the film or films in question.
This process of translation consists of testing a range of words and ex-
pressions until we find those that are sympathetic to the context (of film and
viewer). Finding the right expression, a suitable match in language, allows
a latent or unformed sense to achieve greater clarity, like finally bringing to
mind a proper name one could not quite recall. Moreover, we try to express
our perceptions and our assessments accurately because we want to communi-
cate them reliably. I do not think, however, that the activity is only a matter
of simply matching word to film by some measure of correctness. Tick. It
is a continual process. Describing can lead us to sense more and then notice
more, and leads us to adjacent articulations, and helpful discriminations (that
make all the difference). One articulation, in conversation or criticism, may
lead to another that is more revealing, or differently apt; initially unforeseen
articulations can lead to the realisation of unforeseen aspects. Trying to find
the appropriate words, or deciding between words, or simply acknowledging
the exact place in a film that we are lost for words, or admitting that some
vagueness of response might be faithful and useful – coming to terms with our
perplexity – is all part of a process of understanding and evaluating the work
(and our experience of it). This means that ordinary language film study is
not simply calling on articulate speakers or fine writers (in a literary sense,
for example). I have taught many students who would not deserve those
accolades, but whose communications have been alert, responsive, and au-
thentically self-reflexive. And I have read professional writers with developed
linguistic skills and wide vocabularies whose accounts of films are sealed off,
critically inert, and lacking in perspicuity.
Wittgenstein encourages us to present a ‘perspicacious’ description of the
thing we are trying to understand.58 This descriptive frame of mind is also
a philosophical frame of mind because it is about trying to make sense of
the phenomena – in our case a film – by reconceiving it. For Wittgenstein,
meaning is not deep, hidden, or invisible, yet the relational elements of any
statement, the surface grammar, may still need elucidating. As Richard Allen
and Malcolm Turvey write, ‘[A]s language users we come to master the gram-
mar of our language and operate with ease within it, [but] we typically lack
the ability to give a clear survey of it.’59 Wittgenstein says, ‘we do not com-
mand a clear view.’60 This may be precisely because of the mastery, or simple
familiarity, and is analogous to film viewing. We are familiar with the various
grammars of film expression, especially the common ones, for example Hol-
lywood storytelling, and we can often view films with ease, even those that
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are challenging in their narrative discontinuities. Nevertheless, we ‘typically
lack the ability to give a clear survey of [this grammar]’, and this is what
ordinary language film study wishes to do. Allen and Turvey go on to say
that the ‘perspicacious representations’ that Wittgenstein encourages ‘draws
our attention to aspects of our use of language in practice that we have over-
looked, or not paid sufficient attention to.’61 Correspondingly, I have often
highlighted that one important purpose of film criticism is to ‘draw . . . at-
tention to aspects [of the film] . . . we have overlooked, or not paid sufficient
attention to’. It aims to give a perspicacious survey and representation of a
film.
Wittgenstein’s provocative admonition that for all our perplexity ‘nothing
is hidden’ connects fascinatingly with a crucial statement made by Perkins in
his essay entitled ‘Must We Say What They Mean?’62. In the essay, Perkins
opposes the idea that films consist of implicit and explicit meanings where the
latter are clearly open to everyone and the former, because they are buried,
are dependent on the institutionalised procedures of the critic to unearth.
Envisaged in this way, film interpretation is a matter of uncovering hidden
meanings, and although it may take this form, for Perkins it need not. He
therefore announces:
I suggest that a prime task of interpretation is to articulate in the
medium of prose some aspects of what artists have made perfectly
and precisely clear in the medium of film. The meanings I have
discussed in the Caught [Max Ophüls US 1949] fragment are nei-
ther stated nor in any sense implied. They are filmed. Whatever
else that means . . . it means that they are not hidden in or behind
the movie, and that my interpretation is not an attempt to clarify
what the picture has obscured. I have written about things that
I believe to be in the film for all to see, and to see the sense of.63
Perkins ‘articulates in the medium of prose . . . things that [he] believe[s] to
be in the film for all to see’ but which we may not yet have seen, or not yet
seen the significance.
Through their attention to formal configuration, Wittgenstein’s philoso-
pher and Perkins’ film critic help us come to see ‘aspects of things that are
. . . important for us . . . ’, but which have gone unnoticed ‘because [they are]
always before one’s eyes’.64 I mentioned how Macarthur, in his defence of
OLP’s quietism, described its therapeutic benefits, and this is the point at
which OLP shares an ambition with psychoanalysis, which also wishes to
rid us of established ways of seeing and characterising through a descriptive
method (famously named ‘the talking cure’). Yet, the psychoanalytic con-
nection would not be to ‘a theory of mind’ but rather to ‘psychotherapy as a
practice’.65 Gordon Baker has been influential in stressing the psychoanalyt-
ical aspect to Wittgenstein’s work: philosophical problems are like torments
or mental disturbances which we cannot solve because certain ‘pictures’ hold
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us captive.66 This in turn leads us to misuse our words. We are stuck –
with the same ways of seeing, and with the same descriptions. The philoso-
pher becomes the therapist who helps us with this problem by ‘exposing’
established pictures and ‘winning acceptance of new ones’ through ‘inventive
and imaginative’ handling of our concepts, meanings, and grammar.67 For
OLP, the psychotherapy metaphor need not be taken as implying a binary
illness/wellness picture – one which takes us from sick to healthy, abnormal
to normal – but rather it seeks to encourage a commitment to the potentially
liberating power of an ongoing engagement in descriptive practices. We un-
dergo ‘a kind of conversion’ perhaps with the help of our friends and teachers
who through a process of ‘rational persuasion’ help us to see something dif-
ferently.68 This ‘rational persuasion’ has been conceived in aesthetic terms
as ‘analogous to getting someone to see a poem or a painting according to
a different interpretation or to perceive an unnoticed aspect in an ambigu-
ous drawing’.69 And when Baker refers to ‘rearranging what is familiar’,
‘establishing orderings to dissolve particular confusions’, ‘making patterns
or aspects visible’, and ‘gaining acceptance of alternative pictures’ he is un-
packing Wittgenstein’s philosophical method, but he could be describing the
fundamental features of the aesthetic criticism of films.70
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NOTES
1This essay began life as a keynote
address for the conference ‘Philosophy of
Film Without Theory’ held at the Univer-
sity of York in January 2019 organised by
Craig Fox and Britt Harrison. I am grate-
ful to them for creating the opportunities
for me to carry out this work, and for
suggesting invaluable refinements to this
essay. A longer version which includes
more extensive reference and commentary
in notes can be found at my academia.edu
page. As a film studies academic and not
a philosophy one, I apologise in advance
for any crudity, inexpert lapses, and step-
ping on better qualified toes. The perils
of interdisciplinary work. I hope the phi-
losophy will be considered admissible and
applicable in the context of an appropria-
tion.
2Cavell 1969a and Cavell 1969b.
3Parker-Ryan nd.
4Hacker 2013.
5Parker-Ryan nd.
6Quoted in Hacker 2013.
7Wittgenstein 1953, 27, §66.
8Wittgenstein 1953, 27-28, §66-67.
9Ryle 1971, 215.
10Ryle 1931.
11Austin 1964, 46.
12Austin 1964, 46.
13Quoted in Forguson 2001, 330.
14Hacker 1996, 230.
15Baz 2012, 38.
16Austin 1964, 46.
17Austin 1964, 46.
18Parker-Ryan nd.
19Parker-Ryan nd.
20Cavell 1988, 33.
21Macarthur 2017, 250, 265.
22Macarthur 2017, 269, 265, 262.
23Macarthur 2017, 250.
24Quoted in Forguson 2001, 330.
25Connolly 1993, 37.
26Rée 1993, 10.
27Baz 2012.
28See Klevan 2013, 41-44 about a mo-
ment involving a mirror in Stella Dallas
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[King Vidor US 1937]. Also see the related
short video essay entitled ‘Magnifying Mir-
ror’ at https://vimeo.com/76970307. This
example may serve more generally as a
useful illustration of ordinary language
film study in practice.
29Hacker 2013.
30Hutchinson 2010, 106.
31Hacker 2013.
32Ryle 1954.
33Lash 2020.
34Hacker 2013.
35Hacker 2013.
36Hacker 2013.
37Hanfling 2001, 75, 77.
38Baz 2012, 45.
39Crary and de Lara 2019, 320.
40Crary and de Lara 2019, 319-320.
41Moi 2017, 196.
42Hamawaki 2010, 177.
43Hacker 1996, 108.
44Hacker 1996, 108.
45Bordwell 1985; Bordwell, Staiger, and
Thompson 1985.
46Laugier 2013, 108.
47Martin 2007.
48Almeida 2016, 33.
49Connolly 1993, 37.
50Laugier 2013, 68.
51Parker-Ryan nd.
52Laugier 2013, 68.
53Austin 1964, 47.
54Austin 1964, 47.
55Warnock 1969, 101.
56Wittgenstein 1953, 40, §109.
57Perkins 1990, 4.
58Wittgenstein 1953, 42, §122.
59Allen and Turvey 2001, 10.
60Wittgenstein 1953, 42, §122.
61Allen and Turvey 2001, 10.
62Wittgenstein 1953, 109, §435; Perkins
1990.
63Perkins 1990, 4.
64Wittgenstein 1953, 43, §129.
65Read and Hutchinson 2010, 151;
Adam Phillips, the psychotherapist and es-
sayist, has referred to ‘ordinary language
psychoanalysis’, and it was partly this la-
bel that influenced the title of this essay.
Phillips 1997.
66Baker 2006.
67Baker 2006, 192.
68Morris 2006, 11, 8.
69Morris 2006, 11.
70Baker 2006, 84.
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